Abstract-This paper investigates a two stage equilibrium model for generators' strategic behaviors in contract signing in the forward market and electricity bidding in the electricity spot market. We propose a linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium model to develop generators' optimal bidding strategies considering a forward market equilibrium in the second stage, and show the existence and uniqueness of the two stage stochastic equilibrium. In the numerical test, we present some stability analysis on the impacts of a set of factors on the market clearing price in the spot market and strike price in the forward market.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the electricity industry in many countries has been deregulated. One of the main consequences of the deregulation is that the governments undertake their efforts to develop fully competitive electricity spot markets. In these pool-type electricity markets, a single market clearing price is determined by a sealed-bid auction and paid to each generator for all the power they dispatch, where in practice, generators bid for dispatch by submitting a stack of pricequantities to an independent system operator (ISO).
Various game-theoretic frameworks such as Nash-Cournot, Nash-Bertrand and Nash supply function equilibrium models, have been proposed to investigate the competition in the spot markets. Among these models, the supply function equilibrium (SFE) model recognizes the bidding rules in pool-type markets [14] . The SFE model is originally proposed by Klemperer and Meyer [12] to model competition in an oligopoly market where market demand is uncertain and each firm aims to find an optimal supply function (which is a smooth nondecreasing function) which gives rise to the maximal profit at any demand scenario and a supply function equilibrium is mathematically described by a set of differential equations. Green and Newbery [8] investigate the SFE model to simulate the competition in electricity in England and Wales. Since then, the SFE has become a main model to investigate generators' bidding behavior and market competition. Baldick, Grant and Kahn [4] extend the model to a piecewise linear SFE model by using an ad hoc approach to construct piecewise affine supply functions. Rudkevich [14] presents an adaptive learning process to model competition in the electricity market and shows that generators can obtain their equilibrium profit maximizing behavior by relying on market observations and without adding data on the generation costs and contractual commitments of their competitors. Anderson and Xu [3] discuss the existence of symmetric SFE model with capacity constraints, and show that symmetric generators may achieve an equilibrium which gives them maximal expected profits. More recently, Holmberg [10] obtains the existence and uniqueness of the SFE in a symmetric case with perfectly inelastic demand, a price cap and capacity constraints.
Along with the spot market emerges the forward market where generators and retailers may enter into hedge contracts before bidding in the spot market. For example, in the early 1990s, during the restructuring of the electricity market in UK, some long term, "take-or-pay" contracts (or agreements) are stipulated by three main Scottish electricity generators. The most common type of contract is known as a (two-way) contract-for-difference (or hedge contract), and the signing of this type of contracts is separate from the market dispatching mechanism and can be taken as financial instruments without an actual transfer of power. It is well known that forward contracts have an impact on generator's bidding behavior in spot markets. See for instance Green [7] , Green and Newbery [8] , Anderson and Xu [3] . Allaz and Vila [1] investigate the forward-spot market as bilevel game. They consider a NashCournot model and show that the existence of the contract market increases the efficiency of spot markets. Similar results are also observed by Gans, Price and Woods [6] , Willems [17] and Bushnell [5] . By extending the work of Allaz and Vila [1] , Su [16] focuses on the existence results for this bilevel Nash-Cournot game problem. Moreover, some more recent studies, Yao, Adler and Oren [19] , Hobbs and Pang [9] and Hu and Ralph [11] incorporate these bilevel game problem into some spatial electricity markets with transmission constraints. More recently, Zhang, Xu and Wu extend Gans, Price and Woods [6] to an oligopoly electricity market by considering a stochastic equilibrium program with equilibrium constraint (SEPEC) model. However, modeling the bilevel market within a Nash-Cournot framework only takes every generators as a price-taker and ignores the feature that actual markets give each generator a right to bid for its dispatch schedule. Besides the Nash-Cournot models, Niu, Baldick and Zhu [13] apply the SFE framework to investigate the interaction between spot markets and fixed forward contracts.
The main focus of this paper is to look into interactions between generation in the spot market and contract signing in the forward market within a framework of SFE. The reminder of this paper is arranged as follows. Based on a nodal market, in Section 2, we mathematically formulate a forward-spot electricity market into a two-stage stochastic equilibrium problem (supply function equilibrium model in the spot market and Cournot model in the forward market). In Section 3, we show the existence and uniqueness of Nash-Cournot equilibrium and hence Nash equilibrium in this two-stage game problem. In Section 4, by performing some numerical tests, we present some stability analysis on the impacts of a set of factors on the market clearing price in the spot market and strike price in the forward market.
II. A TWO-STAGE EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
We model the generators' competition in the forward-spot market as a two-stage stochastic Nash game. In the first stage, generators competitively sign the contracts in the forward market and in the second stage they noncooperatively bid for actual dispatch in the spot market. The contracts are signed for a relatively long period, often a year, and there is a round of negotiations on contracted dispatch quantities which involves both generators and demanders (utilities, loadserving agencies, and large consumers) at the same time. In investigating the optimal negotiation strategy of each generator, we assume that generators have rational expectations of supply function equilibrium in the spot market.
With the negotiating outcomes in the forward market, generators move forward into the second stage, the spot market. Due to the non-storability of electricity, the spot market requires every generator to submit its dispatching schedule to the ISO before the realization of market demand. After the realization of the market demand and receiving dispatching schedules from all generators, the ISO determines a market clearing price, at which the actual demand can be met by the aggregated supply.
A. The competition in the spot market
In the spot market, we mathematically model the strategic bidding mechanism within the framework of supply function approach. Consider a spot market as a day-ahead oligopoly market with N generators indexed by i, i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , N }. We assume that each generator i signs a two-way contract of quantity x i at a particular strike price
To ease the notation, we write all generators' contract quantities in a vector form as
T . Note that all forward contracts are financial instruments, they do not involve dispatch of power and are determined before the realization of the actual demand. Moreover, we assume that, in the forward market, the capacity of the contract quantity signed by each generator i isx i for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and hence each generator i's contract quantity takes its value in the set
To emphasize the competition in the forward market, we further formulate the strike price as
T denotes the contracted quantities of its rivals.
Given that, before entering the spot market, the contract position x in the forward market is known to every generator, generator i offers its dispatch schedule to the ISO before the realization of the demand uncertainty in the spot market with considering the impact of x on its profit maximizing: that is, quantity S i (p) (supply function) would be dispatched to the pool market if the spot market is cleared at the price p. Here, we rewrite the supply function as S i (p, x) to emphasize the impact from x. We can intuitively observe that supply function from each generator is a non-decreasing function which indicates that the higher the market price, the more quantity a generator will dispatch. Moreover, let p M denote the price ceiling and q M i denote generator i's capacity limit. Without loss of generality, we set q
In the spot market, the demand is characterized by a smooth function D (p, (ω)) giving the interaction between the quantity of demand and the spot price. Here, the random shock : Ω → Ξ is a continuous random variable defined on probability space (Ω, F, P ) with a known distribution, where in the problem, we define that Ξ is a set as [ 1 , 2 ]. To ease the notation, we write (ω) as and this should be distinguished from being a deterministic vector in a context. As discussed in most of literature, we take the demand to be a strictly decreasing function of spot price p, that is D (p) < 0, and further assume D(p) to be continuously differentiable w.r.t.
With the realized demand shock * , the ISO clears the spot market by choosing a price p * to balance the dispatches and the demand, i.e.
where for any fixed contract quantities x. Because of the monotonicity of D(p) and S i (p) w.r.t p for i = 1, 2, . . . , N there exists one solution to (1) . Now, we proceed to denote r i (q, p) as the profit obtained by generator i if it dispatches an amount q when the spot market is cleared at spot price p, which involves three terms as follows:
(a) Revenue pq i from selling an amount of q i of electricity in spot market. (b) The cost of generating an amount q i of electricity, denoted by C i (q i ), which is assumed to be an increasing convex function of q i . Throughout this paper, we take C i (q i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , to be continuously differentiable w.r.t. q i . (c) The commitment to the contract signed in the forward market,
Thus, we arrive at the expression of generator i's profit function r i (q, p):
If the market clears at a price p, given the other generators' supply S j (p) for j = i, generator i meets the residual demand by supplying
This gives generator i a profit in the spot market as
Since the supply functions are all smooth, and there is no other constraints, then the optimal choice of the price for generator i, is achieved when
Note that, (3) mathematically indicates that the SFE in the contract market depends on the contract position x. Hence, we can write it as {S * i (p, x)} i∈N or {S i (p, x)} i∈N in the following sections.
B. The competition in the forward market
For the simplicity of discussion, we assume that the forward market is also an oligopoly market with the same generators. In the forward market, each generator competes to sign contracts for dispatching a certain amount of electricity power, x i , in the spot market at a strike price h i (x i , x −i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Since forward contracts are predetermined before the spot market, the market clearing price cannot (directly) affect the forward contract. Moreover, because contracts signed by different generator means the same obligation of dispatching a certain mount of energy at a strike price, we assume that all generators sign their contracts at the same strike price, denoted by h(x 1 , · · · , x N ) or h(x i , x −i ). Anticipating the SFE characterized by (3) in the spot market and its rivals' contract quantities fixed in the forward market, generator i determines its contracts quantity x i to optimize its expected profit function in the entire forward-spot market.
To describe the competition in the forward market, we rewrite each generator's supply function as S i (p, x i , x −i ). Thus, in the forward market, the decision problem of individual generator is to choose a quantity x i to optimize its expected profit function in the forward-spot market before knowing the realization of demand uncertainty ξ,
Consequently, combining the SFE in the spot market, we give the following definition on the two-stage stochastic equilibrium in the forward-spot market. Definition 2.1: A stochastic equilibrium in the forward-spot market is a 2N tuple (x * 1 , . . . , x * N , S * 1 (·, x * ), . . . , S * N (·, x * )) such that for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , x * i solves the optimization problem
where p solves the supply function equilibrium (3) in the spot market.
III. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE TWO-STAGE EQUILIBRIUM
Suppose that generator i knows the supply functions that the other generators will bid in the spot market and its rivals' contract positions in the forward market. Then, each generator i's decision problem in the forward market is to sign an optimal contract quantity x i given the SFE in the spot market. If a spot market equilibrium S(p, x) = (S 1 (p, x) , · · · , S N (p, x)) T is reached, each generator can anticipate its overall expected profit in the forward-spot market written as
where S −i (p, x) := j =i S j (p, x) and the expectation is taken over all possible realizations of the demand shock . Proposition 3.1: Assume that the supply function in the spot equilibrium satisfies the condition ∂S i (p, x)/∂x j = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and ∀j = i. If each contract quantity x i and the supply function S i (p, x) are chosen jointly to maximize the generator i's expected profit given its rivals sign contract quantity x −i , then the strike price h i (x i , x −i ) in the forward market exceeds the expected value of the spot price p by a hedge premium of −x i ∂hi(xi,x−i) ∂xi . We can equally reformulate the result in this proposition as
which implies that the rate of revenue of selling contract ∂x i h i /∂x i in the forward market equals the expected price E[p] under the optimal condition. In the rest of the section, we restrict the supply function of each generator to be linear. Moreover, to solve (3) in the spot market, functional forms must be specified for both demand and marginal costs. One of the simple functional forms of the demand widely considered in the literature is the linear demand function which can be formulated as
Moreover, in this section, we consider a well discussed convex cost function as
which means that the marginal cost C i (q i ) is an affine function with a nonnegative intercept d i and a positive slope c i . By considering the affine case, we step further to investigate the existence and uniqueness of the stochastic equilibrium defined in Definition 2.1. Specifically, as in [14] , each generator submit a nondecreasing linear supply function
] to the ISO before the realization of demand shock, which can be written as
where the intercept α i (x) and β i (x), according to Definition 2.1, can be taken as functions of the contract quantities x signed in the forward market. First, by substituting functional forms of the demand and marginal costs into the SFE conditions (3), we can easily have the following result:
Lemma 3.2: The equations
have a unique positive solutions β 1 (x), β 2 (x), · · · , β N (x). Moreover, β 1 (x), β 2 (x), · · · , β N (x) are constant for all fixed x, and satisfy the following equations:
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where B is the solution to the following equations
The proof of this lemma is similar as [14] . Here, we introduce the following assumption on the strike price.
Assumption 3.3: In the forward market, all generators reach a strike price h(x i , x −i ) such that for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
We can easily verify that this assumption is more general than the forward-spot price equivalence assumption as h(
The latter is widely assumed in the previous research literature. See [1] , [6] and [16] . With Assumption 3.3, we give the following theorem on the existence and uniqueness of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium with linear supply functions in the spot market, which is the main result in this section. Theorem 3.4: Let Assumption 3.3 hold. There exists a unique equilibrium in the contract market (x * 1 , · · · , x * N ). Moreover, the equilibrium satisfies that x i ≥ 0 and solves the equations,
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and
This theorem shows the existence and uniqueness of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in the forward market. Combining the results in Lemma 3.2, we have the stochastic equilibrium in the forward-spot market.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we present two numerical examples to gain insight about bidding behaviors of generators in the forwardspot market equilibrium and describe how the linear forwardspot market model works.
In the first example, we carry out some computer simulations for several forward-spot market models. We investigate how expected profits, contract quantities and strike price vary on the change of a generator's marginal cost rate by fixing its rivals' cost functions. Similarly, in the second example, the interaction between the sensitivity of the demand function w.r.t. the spot price and the bidding behavior of each generator will be analyzed. In this example, we show how expected profits, contract quantities and strike price vary on the change of the slope of linear demand function. Note that, in these examples, we use a sample average approximation (SAA) approach to approximate the expected values. SAA is a popular method in stochastic programming; see [15] , [18] and the references therein. In the numerical tests, we use mathematical programming codes in GAMS installed in a PC with Windows XP operating system and the built-in solver path for solving these numerical game problems.
Example 4.1: Consider a forward-spot market with 3 generators indexed by i = 1, 2 and 3, and the demand function in the spot market is given as a linear function as
In the example, we set A = 37.5 and the slope b = 0.8. Moreover, is a random variable following a truncated normal distribution with 4 mean, standard deviation of 4, and truncated at one deviation above and below the mean. In the forward market, we assume that each generator i signs its contract at an identical strike price h(x i , x −i ), which is given by a linear function as h(x i , x −i ) := 18.5 − Based on these supply functions, we obtain that the strike price h i (x i , x −i ) in the forward market is 16.605 and expected spot price E[p(x, )] is 15.974 by optimizing each generator's expected profit Π i (x i , x −i ). Moreover, the simulation results of the contract quantities, the average quantities in the spot market, and the overall expected profits in the forward-spot market are given in the Table I .
In Figure 1 -4, we fix generator 1 and 2's cost functions, and examine the change of each generator's bidding behavior in the forward market and dispatch in the spot market by varying generator 3's marginal cost rate c 3 increases from 1.7 to 2.7. Observe that, in Figure 1 , the strike price and the average clearing price in the spot market increase as the marginal cost rate c 3 increases from 1.7 to 2. show that, when the average marginal cost function in the market is increased, the price in the spot market and hence the forward market will be increased correspondingly. Moreover, if each generator signs the same strike price in the forward market, then generators would behave more aggressively in dispatching and prefer a lower spot price in the spot market than the strike price, see in Figure 1 .
On the other hand, by the decreasing monotonicity of the linear demand function, the realized demand in the spot market decreases along with the increase of the spot price. Figure 2 illustrates that, when the average marginal cost rate, the market demand decreases and each generator's dispatch quantity in the spot market also decreases. Consequently, in the forward market, each generator's contract quantity x i for i = 1, 2, 3 also decreases. Moreover, from Figure 2 , we can verify that, when the marginal cost rate c 3 is enough high, the contract quantity of generator 3 changes more significantly than its rivals. From Figure 3 , generator 3's overall profit monotonically decreases from 54.286 to 45.678, while its rivals' overall profits increase as c 3 varies from 1.7 to 2.7, because they relatively take better market positions than generator 3 for electricity dispatch in the spot market. In the following example, by considering an electricity market with a linear demand function, we investigate the interaction between the slope of the demand function and the bidding and dispatching behaviors of generators in the forwardspot market, and analyze the impact on the strike price, contract quantities and expected profits by varying the sensitivity of the market demand w.r.t. the spot price, dD(p, )/dp. 
In the model, we set c 1 = 0.8, c 2 = 1.0 and c 3 = 1.2, and set d 1 = 3, d 2 = 5 and d 3 = 5. Moreover, the strike price signs by each generator in the forward market is h(x i , x −i ) = 10.5 − 3 i=1 θ i x i . We also assume that the demand function in the spot market takes a linear form as D(p, ) = A − bp + . For the analysis of the impact on generators' behaviors, we fix the intercept A = 20 and vary the slope b from 1.0 to 1.5. The random variable follows a truncated normal distribution with 4 mean, standard deviation of 4, and truncated at one deviation above and below the mean.
In the following, we apply the theoretical framework in Section 2 and 3 to this example and show the changes on each generator's behavior by varying the sensitivity of market demand w.r.t. spot price.
Note that, by the spot market clearing mechanism (1) and the supply functions S i (p, x) = α i (x) + β i p for i = 1, 2, 3, we have that the spot price is a decreasing function of b, which can be verified in Figure 4 . In Figure 5 , we can find that, when the market demand is more sensitive to the spot price, each generator would like to sign more contract quantity in the forward market. Figure 6 gives the relationship between each generator's expected profit and the slope of the demand function. Fig. 4 . The strike price h(xi, x−i) and the average spot price . 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a two-stage stochastic equilibrium model for studying interactions between the forward market and the spot market. The model is essentially an extension of a Nash-Cournot model proposed by Niu, Baldick and Zhu (2005) for an SFE model with fixed contracts. A number of restrictions have been made to simplify the discussions: (a) every generator's bid schedule is formulated into a set of linear supply functions; (b) the spot market competition is assumed to take place in a single node where the network constraints and transmission costs are not considered. We believe that similar equilibrium results can be established by dropping some of the restrictions in our future work.
